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Abstract—This paper describes the implementation of an on-
line transient stability assessment software, composed of 
algorithms for contingency screening and for the design of 
preventive control actions. The implementation of the two parts 
rely on a hybrid method called SIME, coupled with a time 
domain simulation engine and power flow program. The speed up 
of the contingency screening module is obtained by distributing 
contingencies on a cluster of computers to comply with extended 
real-time speed requirements. A compensation scheme is used to 
determine active power rescheduling alternatives in order to 
stabilize the dangerous contingencies identified at the screening 
step. The software has been coupled with an industrial EMS 
platform, and tested in the simulation environment.  
 
Keywords: transient stability assessment and control, distributed 
processing, energy management system, SIME. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
To take care of security in a preventive way, the operator 
needs to assess system behavior with respect to a certain 
number of plausible contingencies, both from a static and a 
dynamic point of view. While there exists state-of-the-art 
software for these tasks, in the past only static security 
assessment has been implemented for on-line operation, 
dynamic security (transient stability and voltage stability) 
being handled through operating rules precompiled during off-
line studies. If this option could be justified by the simulation 
time necessary for analyzing dynamic security, things have 
changed nowadays with the improvements in computer speeds 
and with the emergence of new algorithms taking benefit of 
these improvements. On the other hand, economic and 
environmental pressures tend to operate systems closer to their 
limits and the risk of dynamic instabilities tends therefore to 
increase. So, in the last ten years, many attempts have been 
made in order to develop on-line dynamic security assessment 
and in particular on-line transient stability assessment (TSA). 
This paper presents such a software coupled with a 
commercial energy management system (EMS) combined with 
a dispatcher training simulator (DTS).  
The paper is organized as follows : Section II describes the 
overall structure and implementation of the software; Section 
III gives some details concerning the TSA contingency 
filtering, assessment and preventive control modules;  Section 
IV provides examples and tests results obtained using the 
software in different conditions. The last section provides 
conclusions and suggestions for further improvements. 
II.  OVERALL SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION 
On-line TSA functions could either be integrated into the EMS 
platform (as it is the case for most static security assessment 
tools used in control centers) or implemented externally, i.e. in 
a separate, possibly ad hoc,  computing environment loosely 
coupled with the EMS system. The latter approach, adopted in 
this paper has several advantages. In particular, the TSA 
function implementation and performances are essentially 
independent of the internal organization of the EMS platform, 
which improves maintainability, portability, as well as 
scalability of the TSA function itself. It also protects the EMS 
platform with respect to possible malfunctions of the TSA 
system. In the following, we start by first describing the overall 
principle of our TSA function and of its implementation, and 
then proceed by describing how this is coupled with an 
existing EMS platform.  
A.  Overall TSA function principle 
The TSA function is composed of two main modules : 
 Contingency screening module (CS) 
 Preventive control module (PC) 
These modules are controlled by a supervisory master process 
(MP) according to the following outline : 
 MP receives real-time or study mode data from the EMS; it 
is triggered upon operator request, or in a cyclic way. 
 MP first interrupts ongoing computations by CS and/or PC, 
if there are any such computations under way. 
 MP then calls the CS module with the list of contingencies  
to screen; the CS identifies among these latter a subset of 
dangerous and potentially dangerous contingencies. 
 MP displays the list of dangerous contingencies and passes 
it to the PC module; the PC module identifies preventive 
control actions to reschedule active power among 
generators, so as to stabilize these contingencies.    
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 MP displays the rescheduling actions, applies them to the 
current operating point, and passes the modified base case 
back to CS in order to cross-check the potentially dangerous 
contingencies. 
 If, after that step, some of the previously non dangerous  
contingencies have become dangerous (subsequently to the 
rescheduling), MP calls again PC and so on, until 
convergence or interruption to handle a new TSA request. 
 The decision to actually apply the suggested active power 
rescheduling at any time of this process is left to the 
operator. 
 
Both CS and PC modules use a hybrid TSA method based on a 
single-machine equivalent derived from time-domain 
simulations (SIME). Depending on processor speed, power 
system size and level of detail of dynamic modeling, the CPU 
time required by either of these processes varies between 1 and 
20 seconds per contingency. The CS handles typically a very 
large number of contingencies (several hundreds in practical 
cases) while the PC module generally receives at most a few 
tens of dangerous contingencies. Thus, in most practical 
situations the constraining part of this TSA function is the CS 
module. The CS module has therefore been implemented in 
our software using parallel distributed processing while, at the 
current stage, the PC module runs on a single processor. 
B.  Distributed CS processing 
Distributing the tasks on a certain number of computers is 
necessary to comply with the extended real-time requirements 
for TSA where the objective is to reach a response time 
smaller than 15 minutes (e.g. for one complete CS followed by 
one PC cycle) in a realistic situation (system size: 200-300 
generators, 2000 buses, 4000 lines; processor speed: 2GHz; 
1000 contingencies). The distributed configuration of the CS 



























Figure 1. Description of the CS distribution process 
 
One instance of the “Client process” (CP) is running  on each 
client computer. The master program (called “Dispatch 
process” (DP)) executes common tasks, like scheduling of 
contingencies on CPs and management of common data.  
The CS module works as follows: 
 The DP first sends a message to each CP to start the 
screening mode (communications are based on TPC/IP 
sockets), together with the data files needed for the 
contingency screening (network data, dynamic models).  
 Then each CP addresses to the DP a request to obtain a list 
of  contingencies to process. Upon response from the DP,  
the CP starts treating the contingencies and, when finished, 
it sends its results back to DP for storage in the database. 
Notice that in order to reduce communication overheads, 
each client receives at each request a (configurable) number 
of contingencies to analyze.  
 The DP maintains for each contingency a status flag which 
can take three values (ND = not dispatched, D = dispatched, 
P = processed). When a contingency is dispatched, the DP 
changes its status from ND to D. When results come back, 
the DP changes the status from D to P.  
 If, at a given stage, a client sends back a request for new 
contingencies while all of them have already been 
dispatched, the DP nevertheless will send some (already 
dispatched) contingencies back to this CP.  This way of 
doing allows tackling the fact that some CPs may be slower 
than others, or in the worst case may not respond at all, 
while balancing the load among all CPs and achieving 
minimum response time.  
Notice that the DP is designed to allow the dynamic insertion 
or retrieval of CP processes, but the implementation is 
constrained to at most one CP process per client computer. 
The software has been implemented with Intel PC boxes 
operating under Windows (NT4 or 2000), but could in 
principle also operate with a heterogeneous set of clients. The 
optimal number of clients is obviously dependent on the size 
of the power system model and the length of the contingency 
list under consideration. Section IV will provide illustrative 
examples using a medium size system and variable numbers of 
processors demonstrating the scalability of the approach. 
C.  Contingencies building 
Due to the fact that it is difficult to simulate all possible 
contingencies that may exist, a judicious choice should be 
made. In this implementation, the choice of the contingencies 
can be made manually or automatically. If the automatic mode 
is chosen, the software can, for example, make a short circuit 
at each end of a line and clear the short-circuit by opening the 
line in the post-fault. The manual choice is available to let the 
operator add some specific contingencies that have not been 
taken into account by the automatic mode. 
D.  Connection to the EMS platform 
Data coming from the EMS platform are the state 
estimator data, or, in study mode, the power flow data. These 
data have been preferred to the SCADA data because they are 
supposed to be more accurate. In our experiments the software 
has been coupled with the DTS (dispatcher training simulator) 
of the ALSTOM/ESCA platform. This latter is a replica of the 
EMS environment together with a program simulating the slow 
drift of the power system state and telecommunications. This 
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platform provides a certain number of possibilities of 
connection from the outside world. One of these is composed 
of the HABDDE-SAMPLER running on the EMS side and the 
HABDDE client utility running on the outside system, in our 
case the PC running the MP and DP processes. The TSA-MP 
communicates directly with HABDDE by the use of dynamic 







































Figure 2.  Coupling of the TSA master process and the EMS/DTS 
 
The data received from the platform are stored in a relational 
database from which they can be dispatched to the different 
clients. Via the HABDDE and DDE links, the contents of this 
database are maintained synchronous with the EMS database 
on which it is connected, which (as already mentioned) could 
be either the real-time network database (updated from 
SCADA by the state-estimator) or the study mode network 
database, updated by the study mode tools (power flow, 
optimal power flow) of the EMS.  
III.  TSA FUNCTION 
The TSA function is composed of the contingency screening 
and preventive control modules (CS and PC, respectively). 
Both rely extensively on the coupling of the SIME method 
[1,2,3,4] with a time-domain simulation program which was 
developed  on purpose for this project. 
A.  Screening and filtering  the contingencies (CS) 
The CM module classifies the contingencies into three 
groups: the group of dangerous ones, the potentially dangerous 
ones, and the non-dangerous ones. The module implements the 
FILTRA method [4], which computes stability margins and 
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   Figure 3. Contingencies filtering 
 
The filtering consists of two pipelined steps (Figure 3):  
1. A fast simulation is carried out with a relatively large 
clearing time CT1 (for example 200 ms). The simulation is 
stopped by SIME as soon as either the return angle is 
reached (stable case) or as the instability is detected. At this 
step, the possibility of using a simplified model for 
representing the machines exists.  
2. The second step re-simulates in detail the cases declared 
unstable at step 1, using the actual clearing time of 
protection systems (denoted  CT2 in Figure 3). Here, a 
detailed model is used for the representation of the machines 
and, in the first swing stable cases, the simulation runs till 
the end of the observation time (say 10s) to check for multi-
swing instabilities.  
The contingencies declared stable at step 1 are classified as 
“non-dangerous”, those declared unstable at step 2 are called 
“dangerous”, the others are classified as “potentially 
dangerous”. The first class is discarded after the CS process 
has finished. The “dangerous” contingencies are given as input 
to preventive control module. 
B.  Stabilization of the unstable contingencies (PC) 
This is done by using a compensation scheme [2], which is a 
by-product of the SIME method. The purpose of the 
compensation scheme is to assess approximately the amount of 
power adjustment necessary to stabilize the power system. Its 
derivation relies on the computation of stability margins and 
identification of the critical machines driving the system’s 
instability. Part of the power produced by the critical machines 
is shifted to non-critical machines in order to increase the 
stability margin. The stabilization process is iterative and 
handles at each iteration simultaneously all the dangerous 
contingencies, in the following way : 
1. Starting with the results obtained from the CS module, and 
for each dangerous contingency, the PC module determines 
which machines’ active powers must be reduced and by how 
much, using the compensation scheme.  
2. The resulting changes obtained for each dangerous 
contingency are compared to determine the total change 
needed to stabilize all contingencies simultaneously. 
3.  A new operating point is created by re-dispatching this 
amount of power on non critical machines, in order to 
preserve the load-generation balance. This can be done by 
taking into account incremental cost curves of the different 
units used for this operation, so as to minimize the overall 
re-dispatch cost. 
4. The dangerous and non-dangerous contingencies are re-
assessed using step 2 of the CS module. 
If all contingencies are found stable at step 4, the process 
stops, otherwise, the procedure starts again at step 1 with the 
new operating point and the results of step 4 as input. 
C.  Time-domain simulation engine and power flow solver 
The simulation engine used by the CS and PC modules is a 
step-by-step software implemented by the first author. This 
software uses the implicit trapezoidal method [5,6] to solve the 
differential equations. The implementation contains standard 
dynamic models useful for simulations during a period of 5 to 
10 seconds. Five different models of machines have been 
implemented and the software also contains the representation 
of a certain number of control devices: fast-valving, excitation 
systems, speed governors, turbines and PSS.  At the network 
level, static loads, dynamic loads and SVCs have been 
implemented. The different models of devices represented are 
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the common models recommended by IEEE task forces 
[8,9,10,11]. A home made Newton-Raphson power flow solver 
is used during the iterations of the PC module. 
IV.  TESTS AND CASE STUDIES 
This section provides a certain number of simulation results 
aiming at assessing the TSA function from an implementation 
point of view and at illustrating the various features of the 
software. We start with some examples to show the 
functionalities of the software, using the rather small “ESCA 
test system” installed on the EMS-DTS platform running in the 
control center laboratory of the University of Liège. Then we 
provide more realistic simulations using the IEEE 50-machine 
test system [13] in order to test the distributed processing 
feature of the software. 
A.  On-line simulations using the ESCA system  
    1)  Scenario 
The operating point used in the 60 bus ESCA system has 15 
generators running. For the purpose of the study, these 
generators have been modeled in detail, with excitation 
systems, speed governors and turbine models. These dynamic 
models are stored and maintained in the database of the TSA 
function and not in the EMS. A fixed step size of 10 ms has 
been selected for the integration process in the step-by-step 
program, and a maximum simulation period of 5 seconds has 
been settled for each contingency simulation. Since the system 
is rather small (74 buses, 85 branches, 15 synchronous 
machines), a single CPU configuration was used to run the on-
line TSA (300 Mhz Celeron, 64 MB of Ram, Windows NT4). 
The EMS-DTS platform, on the other hand,  runs on a DEC-
Alpha workstation operating Digital-Unix. 
 
    2)  Contingency selection 
An automatic selection has been done implementing a short-
circuit at each node and opening a line in the post-fault 
situation. This gave us a total of 84 contingencies to screen. 
 
    3)  Screening and filtering 
This step allows us to discard the harmless contingencies. 
The first step uses a clearing time of 300 ms. The second step 
uses a clearing time of 200 ms. This clearing time would not 
be  realistic in practice, but it has been chosen for the purpose 
of the study (indeed, the protection devices nowadays can 
respond in a time of two to five cycles). In this example, a 
detailed model is used for the two steps of the filtering. After 
running all the contingencies, from the 84 ones selected, 4 
have been detected as dangerous. 
 
    4)  Stabilization process 
At this step, The PC module tries to stabilize the dangerous 
contingencies. By using the compensation scheme, it reduces 
the critical machines’ active power to stabilize simultaneously 
all the dangerous contingencies. Table 1 describes the 
stabilization process, which took here 4 iterations. 
 
 
Figure 4. Description of the software interface during the 
contingencies filtering 
TABLE 1.  










First  iteration 
Conting46 -69.92 0.34 -247 G14 57 
Conting55 -47.22 0.34 -247 G14 60 
Conting57 -11.83 0.41 -149 G15 69 
Conting58 -25.63 0.31 -149 G15 50 
Second  iteration 
Conting46 -16.55 0.56 -112 G14 89 
Conting55 -13.94 0.61 -112 G14 84 
Conting57 0.00 5.00 75 G15 - 
Conting58 -13.54 0.56 -68 G15 89 
Third iteration 
Conting46 -1.66 1.09 -23 G14 106 
Conting55 0.00 5.00 0.00 G14 - 
Conting58 -1.16 0.99 -16 G15 99 
Forth iteration 
Conting46 39.57 5.00 22 G14 - 
Conting58 12.18 5.00 15 G15 - 
 
The first column of Table 1 gives the names of the 
contingencies, the second one the stability margin (an 
indication of the degree of stability or instability), and the third 
column shows the simulation time. In the case of unstable 
contingencies (negative margin) this time corresponds to the 
time where SIME detects instability; in the case of stable 
simulations it corresponds to the maximum observation time 
fixed for the case (5 seconds in our simulations). Notice that 
the simulation time of the unstable cases is in average ten 
times smaller than that of the stable ones. The fourth column 
shows the power (in MW) to retrieve from the critical 
machines determined by the compensation scheme. The fifth 
column gives the critical machines and the last column gives 
the separation angle (in degrees) between the last critical 
machine and the first non-critical machine. This information is 
used to determine how to share the amount of rescheduled 




Figure 5. OMIB curves of contingency 46 at the second iteration 
 
Notice that the amount of power rescheduled for each machine 
is for each iteration the maximum value suggested by the 
different contingencies. These values are cumulated over the 
successive iterations. Notice also that in Table 1, the last 
iteration actually compensates for a slight over-stabilization 
resulting from the first three iterations.  
 
    5)  Rescheduling of the power on non critical machines 
The rescheduling on the non-critical machines is made 
taking into account the incremental costs of the different 
generators. After the stabilization, a check is needed to ensure 
that the stabilization process has not destabilized some 
contingencies which were stable at the beginning. At this level, 
many patterns may exist for this check. We can, for example, 
decide to check only the “potentially dangerous” 
contingencies, or we can decide to check the entire list of 
candidate contingencies. In the present test, we chose the latter 
option. This new screening of the contingencies has shown that 
after the rescheduling there were no dangerous contingencies 
anymore.  
 
    6)  Graphical outputs of the software 
The TSA software can display information from the CS and 
PC steps in graphical form. Figure 5 gives the Power-Angle 
curves (equal area criterion diagram) corresponding to the 
simulation of contingency 46 at the second iteration of the 
stabilization process. This graphic shows the relation between 
the relative angle of the center of inertia of the critical 
machines and the remaining non-critical machines and their 
equivalent electrical and mechanical powers [4]. One can see 
graphically that the decelerating area is much smaller than the 
accelerating area, reflecting the fact that the contingency is still 
unstable. The (negative) stability margin is actually the 
difference between the latter and the former areas, or 
equivalently the kinetic energy of the single-machine 
equivalent when the unstable angle is reached (intersection of 
electrical and mechanical power curves). Figure 6 shows the 
individual machines’ swing curves after the last step of the 
stabilization, confirming that contingency 46 has indeed been 
stabilized. 
 
The total simulation time for the on-line test using a single 
CPU is of about 3 minutes. An evaluation of the total 
integration time of the first loop of the  filtering    scheme gave 
 
 
    Figure 6. Swing curves of contingency 46 at the last iteration 
 
140.13 time domain integration seconds (sTDI), in other 
words about  1.5 sTDI per contingency. This can be compared 
with a total of about 420 sTDI that would be required by a 
pure time-domain method. Hence the SIME method reduces 
the amount of computation by a factor 3 in this case. Note that 
this  has been confirmed by extensive tests [4]. 
B.  Parallel distributed processing tests 
    1)  Scenario 
The network used here is the IEEE 50 generator system. This 
system is not implemented on the ALSTOM EMS-DTS 
platform and hence the tests are carried out in off-line mode, 
i.e. using as inputs data in the form ASCII text files. 
This test is carried out to check the behavior of the distributed 
process in conditions closer to the possible use of the software 
in real life (larger system and larger number of contingencies). 
The integration step is still 10 ms and we use a simulation time 
of 5 seconds. The dynamic model used is similar to the one 
used in the previous test. The power system model itself is 
composed of 145 buses and 453 branches. 
 
    2)  Contingency list 
 Choosing the automatic option of a short-circuit at each 
bus and opening a line in the post-fault period gives us a total 
of 892 contingencies (the lines which created a degree of 
connectivity greater than one have not been selected since the 
software does not, for the time being, take into account the 
case where several islands coexist).  
 
    3)  Contingency screening in distributed mode 
The distributed option has been selected for the filtering of the 
contingencies. Four computers have been selected for this task.  
- PC1 : processor 266 Mhz (one CP) 
- PC2 : processor 300 Mhz  (the DP runs always on this 
computer, one CP can also run one PC2) 
- PC3 : processor 750 Mhz (one CP) 
- PC4 : processor 1.7 Ghz  (one CP) 
The computers communicate through 100Mbit/s Ethernet local 
area network.  
Different scenarios, corresponding to different combinations of 
these processors,  are run to assess the effectiveness of the 
distributed processing scheme. In each scenario, each CP 
receives at each request 10 contingencies to treat.  
To start with, each computer is taken individually for the entire 
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filtering. The results of theses simulations are given in Table 2. 
TABLE 2.  
 SIMULATION TIME OF EACH COMPUTER TAKEN INDIVIDUALLY 
 
 Processor Simulation time (elapsed) 
PC1 Pentium 266 Mhz 43 min 56 sec 
PC2 Celeron 300 Mhz 31 min 19 sec 
PC3 Pentium 750 Mhz 12 min 45 sec 
PC4 Pentium 1.7 Ghz 5 min 20 sec 
 
Then, beginning from the less powerful computer the 
distributed process is used by adding at each step a new 
computer. The results are given in Table 3. 
 
TABLE 3.  
 SIMULATION TIME OBTAINED BY THE COMBINATION OF THE 
DIFFERENT COMPUTERS 
 
Simulation pattern Simulation time (elapsed) 
PC1+PC2 20 min 41 sec 
PC1+PC2+PC3 8 min 9 sec 
PC1+PC2+PC3+PC4 3 min 50 sec 
  
Figure 7 shows the display of the MP scheduler at the end of 
the execution, which is used to monitor the progress of the CS 
activities over the different processes. One can see that most of 
the work has been done by the 1.7 GHz client, as expected. 
Notice that the load balance is quite close to what could be 
predicted by a theoretical calculation derived from the 
processor speeds (only PC2 appears to be significantly slower 
than predicted, which is due to the fact the MP and DP also 




    Figure 7. Computational load balancing diagram 
 
A second test has been carried out to evaluate the software in a 
situation with more uniformly distributed processing power 
and a larger number of CPs. This consists of 8 Pentium IV 
processors with clock frequencies between 1 and 2 GHz. The 
overall response time is of about 1 minute to handle the full 
list of contingencies. The speed up with respect to the use of 
the single processor configuration is of  a factor 8. 
 
All in all, these tests show the robustness and scalability of the 
distributed contingency screening software. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS 
This paper has described an implementation of an on-line TSA 
function based on the combination of distributed contingency 
screening, a non distributed preventive control module, both 
based on the SIME method combined with a time-domain 
simulation software. SIME itself is responsible for speed up 
factor (with respect to pure time domain simulation) of 3, 
while the distributed processing scheme has been shown to 
provide speed-up factors of more than one order of magnitude 
at the expense of more CPUs. Most noticeable is the 
scalability of the load-balancing scheme used to distribute 
contingency screening among a variable number of possibly 
heterogeneous CPUs, and its robustness with respect to the 
failure of individual processors. The resulting software 
demonstrates the feasibility of on-line TSA for large power 
systems. In addition, it has been coupled loosely with an 
existing commercial EMS-DTS platform in such a way that it 
does not perturb the latter’s real-time functions. 
The software also allows providing guidelines to the operator 
on the way to stabilize his system in case there are dangerous 
contingencies.  
In terms of software implementation, a further development 
concerns the combination of the generation rescheduling 
module with an optimal power flow software integrated in the 
EMS platform, and also the distribution of the preventive 
control module itself.  
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